COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"When the exigencies of the public service could only be met by their voluntary zeal, the PEOPLE started "forth with an ardour, which out-stripped the wishes of those, who had injured them by doubting whether "it might not be necessary to have recourse to compulsion. They have, in all things, reposed an enduring "confidence. That confidence demands a full return; and fixes a responsibility on the ministers entire and "undivided. The people stand acquitted, if the war is not carried on in a manner suited to its objects. If "the public honour is tarnished; if the public safety suffers any detriment; the ministers, not the people, "are to answer it, and they alone. Its armies, its navies, are given to them without stint or restriction. "Its treasures are poured out at their feet; and, theirs alone is the responsibility."——BURKE: Regicide Peace, Letter III.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"TIMES OF DIFFICULTY." —— This phrase has been so frequently applied to the series of years, during which Mr. Pitt has been minister of this country, and its application has so evident a tendency to deceive the nation, or, rather, to continue its deception, as to a very important point, especially at the present crisis, when it behoves them to place their confidence only on those who are well worthy of it, that it appears to me necessary to inquire into the grounds, upon which such application has been made. I have frequently had to remark, cursorily, upon the unfairness, the meanness, the paltry shifts, of those, who attributed the dangers and disgrace of the country to some over-ruling necessity; and that, to use the words of Mr. Pitt himself, "from the *fatality* of the times and the general state "of the world, we must consider our lot as "cast by the decrees of Providence in a "time of peril and trouble."* This was a very pretty come-off for a "heaven-born" minister, who, after having had the absolute command of all the resources of the nation for nearly 20 years, and after having, a hundred times, boasted of his superior skill and purity, was obliged to confess, that the nation was at last reduced to a state, in which it could neither go to war nor remain in peace, with a reasonable prospect of security! A very decent come-off! Something that the Grocer's Company could, twenty years before, hardly have expected! A *heaven-born* minister throwing his blunders upon *Providence!* He felt; he had long felt; but, particularly, at the commencement of the present war, when no one could tell what was the *object* of the war, or how it could end, and when Mr. Addington could only say, that we were at war *because we could not be at peace:* at such a time Mr. Pitt could not fail to perceive, that the eyes of the people would be directed towards him, and that, even his creatures would begin to ask themselves, *who* it was that had brought us into such a state. Hence he perceived the necessity of preaching the doctrine of *fatality*; and, the moment the key was given, the whole pack of his partisans joined in the cry.——As occasion has required, this doctrine has been preached through the columns of the Treasury prints from the time above referred to till now; and, it is by no means wonderful, that the preachers should have become more zealous at this time, when the object of their exculpatory efforts is about to embark as chief in the conducting of a new warlike league against the power, before whom he, but the other day, fell prostrate, after having, for years, been in the almost constant habit of describing her as upon the brink of ruin. One effort of this sort, in the Morning Post of the 31st ultimo, is worthy of particular notice. The passage alluded to appears to have been written with an intention to counteract the endeavours of a writer in the Morning Chronicle to convince the people, that, if they were to judge from the past, they had very little to expect from any war, conducted by Mr. Pitt. "It does not seem "probable" [says the Morning Post], "that he" [the writer in the Morning Chronicle] "will induce the country to be-"lieve with him, that Mr. Pitt's name is "indissolubly associated with the degrada-"tion of Europe and the aggrandizement of "France, because, unluckily for his asser-"tion, the country must recollect, that, un-"der the administration of Mr. Pitt, Great "Britain has uniformly, and for a long "time, *resisted the aggressions of France;* "and that she now forms a rallying point "for the other European nations, which, "had different counsels been followed, "would have been wanting to them. Un-"connected as we are with any party, it "must, we think, on a due and dispassion-"ate consideration of the subject, appear "the glory of Mr. Pitt's life, that *(placed "as he has been in circumstances of such*

* Speech in the House of Commons, 23d May, 1803.

" *peculiar difficulty* that no precedent " existed by which his conduct could be re- " gulated), he has *hitherto* steered the ves- " sel of the state *safely through the tem-* " *pest* by which she was and is assailed, " and will, we doubt not, convey her ulti- " mately into the port of security. Having " first to contend with the principles of " France, he *has now to contend with her* " *arms*. The former *have been defeated*; " the latter will, we confidently hope, meet " with a similar fate. That in the prose- " cution of this arduous contest, it would " be desirable that the present ministry " should be supported by the united abili- " ties of the country, we readily admit. It " is our sincere wish that such a combina- " tion should be formed; we have on every " occasion endeavoured to promote it. We " have therefore abstained from vilifying " those whom we are anxious to see a part " of it; but we regret that in this forbear- " ance we have not been imitated by our " political opponents. In proportion as the " advantages which the nation would derive " from an union of our statesmen becomes " evident, they asperse the man *whom the* " *country must and will demand to be a* " *principal member of that union*. We as- " sume *no merit* for our conduct on this oc- " casion. In following what appears to us " to be the dictates of propriety, we are un- " influenced by any consideration but the " sense of our public duty."——Upon the subject of the Morning Post's *public-spirit* and *disinterestedness* I have only to remark, that I should feel much less mortification than I do, were I assured, that the insertion of the very article, which I have just copied, was not paid for by me, in common with all those, who contribute towards the " *exi-* " *gencies* of the state." The impudence of those who conduct this paper will need no exposure to those who recollect its language and sentiments, during the two last years. It has been equalled in baseness, perhaps, by the SUN, the ORACLE, the COURIER, and some few other papers; but, assuredly, it has never been surpassed by any print in the world.——But, to return to the doctrine of *fatality*. The eulogy on Mr. Pitt, the ground on which his partisans now claim for him the confidence of the people, is, that, under his sway, the country has " uniform- " ly, and for a long time, *resisted the aggres-* " *sions of France*." Or, in other words, has *not been subdued* by France! Sublime eulogy! And is this, at last, to be the foundation of the Grand Operator's fame? Is it, indeed, come to this? Is this to be the pedestal of *the statue*, which the City fools were to raise in commemoration of his deeds? " During his administration Eng- " land *was not subdued* by France!"—— This notion, however, perfectly corresponds with the general way of thinking, which his degrading system has introduced. *Defence; preservation; salvation; protection; safety;* and such like. These are the words we are continually making use of: we never talk of *attacking*, of *avenging*, of *humbling*, of *conquering:* all such ideas seem to have become too big for our minds. That this is a truth no one will deny, and nothing can be more strongly descriptive of debasement. We rejoice; nay, we *boast*, that we are not become the slaves of Frenchmen; and, of course, we are called upon to extol the man, during whose administration, the means of escaping such slavery has been afforded us. This is perfectly consistent; but, then, those who are not degraded to this pitch, have a right to call upon the minister to answer even for that degradation, in which he finds a justification; for when, previous to his administration, did Englishmen content themselves with the reflection, that they were *not the slaves of France?* When, previous to his administration, did so vile a thought find a place in their minds? We really seem to have forgotten the sentiments entertained, not by our forefathers, but by ourselves, in the earlier part of our lives. Let the reader, if he be about forty years old, reflect, for a moment, on the sentiments of his youth, relative to the valour, the power, the character, the consequence, of England and France respectively; let him then compare them with the sentiments, which, as to the same subjects, have now, without his having perceived their progress, got possession of his mind; and, if the result does not make him blush for his country, does not excite his indignation against those, during whose administration the change has taken place, he need fear no invasions, for, except as to the bodily suffering, which he might hope, would not be very great, the conquest of his country and the enslaving of himself would have in them nothing for him to regret. The man who acknowledges, that England has *now become inferior to France*, and who, nevertheless, endeavours to excuse and to justify; who even praises, and who lends his aid still to keep in power, the minister, under whose sway the disgraceful change has come about; such a man (and many such there are) proclaims his degradation, he invites the invader, the conqueror; he tenders his neck to the yoke, bares his back to the lash; he is fashioned for slavery, and ought to be a slave.——But, the apology

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of this description of persons is, as we here see it, in the Morning Post, that, though, the change we speak of is but too real, yet the fault was not Mr. Pitt's. It was nobody's fault. It was the work of Providence; or, if it be to be imputed to any human agency, it was *the fault of the Opposition*, who thwarted the minister in his measures, and who, in fact, compelled him either to ruin the cause of his country, or, *to quit his place*; and, of *course*, he chose the former; and yet, the ruin of that cause was *no fault of his!* All this you shall hear the hirelings of the Treasury, and all the numerous tribe of place-hunters, most deliberately and cooly assert; and, they will, at the same time, not scruple to entertain you for hours with descriptions of the *contemptibleness* of that same opposition! In fact, Mr. Pitt never was hampered with an opposition. From the day of his first triumph over the aristocracy of the country; from that day to the present, he never has had a formidable opposition, in parliament, to encounter. Just at the close of the last session he *would*, indeed, have had a formidable opposition to face; but he took care not to face them, and carried his measures after they had retired to the country. ——" Placed, as he has been, in times of " peculiar difficulty." Not he. He was not " *placed*" in times of peculiar difficulty, nor of any difficulty at all. He, as I have before shown, took the helm at a moment the most favourable that could possibly be. He had eight years of peace, and of great *abundance*, to start with; and, I should suppose, that no people but the good, easy, forgiving, nay, submissive, English, would so soon have forgotten his annual boasts of the unexampled prosperity of the country. These boasts extended to every department and to every part of the King's dominions; so that, when he finally resolved on war, in 1793, the nation appeared, from his accounts, to be ready to burst with prosperity and happiness. Thus far, then; that is to say, during the first eight, or nearly nine years, of his twenty years' administration, he was not, at any rate, placed in times of " peculiar difficulty." The war was long and arduous. True; but *who* made it so? *Who* caused the difficulties that now arose? *Who* determined on the war? And *who* on the manner of conducting it? His partisans are aware of these questions, and, accordingly, they provide themselves with an excuse in the *novelty* of the case, which afforded him no means of profiting from *experience*. Well, suppose the case to have been entirely new; suppose that principles before unheard of could be made applicable to it: even then it required only wisdom to know how to act. And, if I am told, that no human wisdom was equal to the task, I have only to refer to the speeches of Mr. Fox and the writings of Mr. Burke. They disagreed as to the course to be pursued: the former said *peace*, the latter *honourable war:* the former said, let the revolution exhaust itself upon France; the latter said, attack the revolution and kill it in its birth. But, they both said, and they said it over and over again, and in every stage of the war, that the course which Mr. Pitt pursued would lead to the fearful aggrandizement of France, to the overthrow of the balance of Europe, and, of course, to the imminent danger, if not, at last, the subjugation of England. This is a fact which no one can deny, and which every one ought to remember. Continually; year after year and week after week, did Mr. Fox, as any one may now see in his speeches, warn Mr. Pitt of the consequences of the war, and, I will be bound to point out, in those speeches, more than one hundred passages, in which the former specifically predicted, that a perseverance in the war would lead to such an extension of the power of France as would endanger the independence of England. And, as to Mr. Burke, we now find, from his posthumous publications, that he began in 1791, and did not cease to the day of his death, to warn the minister of the consequences (just as have now happened) of a system of warfare such as he had adopted. Here are, then, proofs, that Mr. Pitt was either much less wise than others, or, that he had some object which he preferred to the good of the country. He rejected the advice of others: he followed a course of his own choosing: he suffered no one to thwart him in it: he had all the means of the country in his hands: and, shall he not, according to the doctrine of my MOTTO, be made *responsible*; shall he not yet be made *really* responsible for the disgraceful result? Shall he, who was uniformly surrounded with majorities up to the teeth; he who was constantly boasting of those majorities; he who let pass hardly a week without loading his opponents with contempt; he who had obtained so complete a mastery over the people as to keep the habeas corpus act suspended for years, and to impose and collect ten per centum upon the income of every man, assessed by the means of an inquisition into his most private concerns; he who, to the very eve of the peace, exulted in the inexhaustible resources of the country: shall this man, now that the fatal effects of his measures are perceived and felt; shall he be

suffered to plead the "difficulty of the "times," in which he has had to act? Forbid it justice! Forbid it common sense! Let us not, by admitting this plea, stamp our character for ever with the mark of cullibility!——"He has *hitherto*," the hireling tells us, "steered the vessel of "state safely through the tempest, and will, "we *doubt not*, convey her, ultimately, "into the port in safety." It is a wonder they do not drop this unlucky simile. Lord Belgrave, that fine promising "young "friend" Lord Belgrave assured us, rather more than three years and a quarter ago, that the great man, his "Right Honourable "friend," *had*, even then, conveyed her, actually conveyed her and *anchored* her in safety, "in her native port," where she was "riding *triumphant!*" And so said that other famous "young friend," Mr. Canning, in his *Birth-day Ode*, every stanza of which concluded with "the health of the "pilot that *weathered the storm.*" My readers will do me the justice to recollect, that I then besought them not to regard the storm as *over*; that there was only a treacherous calm; and that the storm would soon revive, a storm not to be weathered by a Pitt.—— But, it seems, we are now to be told, that there were two things to combat in the French revolution; its *principles* and its power. "Having first to contend with the "*principles* of France, he has *now* to con-"tend with her *arms*. The former *he* has "defeated." Defeated by *him!* Good God! by *him!* What has he ever done to defeat them? It is Buonaparté who has defeated them, in the only respect in which they have been defeated. But, in *what way* were they *dangerous?* In the means which they afforded of extending the influence, the domination, the power, *the arms* of France. It was in this light that Mr. Burke always regarded them as dangerous to England, and in which he, in his writings (particularly his papers presented to the cabinet, and now published in the VIIth volume of his works) always described them as dangerous to her: so that, Mr. Pitt's way of *defeating* the principles of France has rendered them productive, in the fullest extent, of the very consequence that was apprehended from their success! "He has now to contend with *her* "*arms.*" Yes, and not with her arms such as *he found them*; not with her arms such as they were before he was our minister; not with her arms such as they were before he began a war upon her principles; but her arms such as they have become, strengthened as they have been during his administration, formidable as they have grown in consequence of those principles which he has so "happily *defeated!*"——The way, and the only way, consistent with any principle of reason or of justice, to estimate the measures, and, of course, the wisdom, of a minister, is to take the two ends of his administration, and make a comparaison of the state of the national affairs, internal and external, at the two epochs. Let us try Mr. Pitt by this rule. As to the prosperity and comfort of the people, he found the poor-rates of England and Wales (when the average price of the quartern loaf was about 7d) amounting annually to 2,167,749l. sterling: he brought this amount in 1803 (the average price of the quartern-loaf being about 10d.) to 5,348,205l. and the number of paupers to about *twelve hundred thousand.* As to the credit of the nation, he found an abundant currency of gold and silver, and he has procured to be passed an act, making paper-money, as to all practical purposes, a legal tender; having, during the progress, swelled the annual sum raised upon us to pay the interest of the national debt, from 9 millions to more than 27 millions. As to our external affairs; he found our ancient rival, and, whenever at war, our enemy, shut up within her long acknowledged limits; he found a balance of power in Europe quite efficient to the purpose of keeping her so; he found her with exhausted resources, with distracted councils, with a feeble and almost tottering government. What she is *now*; what she has become during the time that *he* has had the purse and the sword of England at his absolute command, I leave to be *felt* by the once-swelling but now-palpitating hearts of the Grocer's Company. And, shall we still be told, that he is "a *great man?*" In what part of his character or his measures; in which of his acts, or of their consequences, are we to look for wherewithal to justify this appellation? "He is a great speech-maker." Certainly he is; and a friend of mine, upon the ground of this admission, *proves* him to be a great man; as thus: "A talker's a man; Mr. Pitt "is a great talker; *ergo*, Mr. Pitt is a great "man." But, the Pittites take a still shorter course, contenting themselves with the intuitive proposition, that *he has kept his place for 20 years.* With those, who, like Boyd and Benfield, will, doubtless, want no other proof of greatness, Mr. Pitt will still pass for a "great man;" but, those who estimate the mind and the merits of a statesman according to the effect which his opinions, his declarations, and his measures produce upon the country he has to govern; those who reflect upon the professions and the conduct of

Mr. Pitt with regard to the questions of parliamentary reform, and of negro slavery: those who heard his loud and repeated promises to put an end to the wars and the plunder in India, to reduce the debts of the company, and to make that company assist in defraying the annual expenses of the mother-country: those who heard him vaunt of his discovery for reducing the national debt, and congratulate himself, that, while other ministers had been distinguished by the burdens they had laid upon the people, it would be his glory to be distinguished by the removing of those burdens: those who compare the satisfaction which he expressed at the prospect of having his name inscribed on the proud column raised to national credit, with the law which he has since introduced and procured to be passed for making bank-notes a legal tender: those who reflect on the consequences of his conduct with regard to the partition of Poland: those who now take a review of his measures during the late war with France, not forgetting his repeated assurances to the parliament, that the enemy was upon the brink, nay, in the very gulph of bankruptcy, and must, of course, soon yield for the want of resources to carry on the war: those who recollect his false, his wild calculations, his extravagant exultation (repeated in a pamphlet issued from the Treasury itself and bearing the name of his Official Secretary) upon the subject of the Income-Tax, which he termed the solid system of finance: those who, in the same year, heard him vow, that he never would make peace with France, without obtaining, as a preliminary, a full and adequate security for the future, not only for England but for all and every one of the states upon the continent of Europe; and heard him, at the same time, declare, that he could carry on the war, for any length of time, without the creation of new debt: those who saw him, in less than three years after this, create new debt to the amount of 73 millions sterling, and, within the same space, advise, defend, and extol, a peace completing the total overthrow of the balance of Europe, and leaving no small part of its formerly-independent states in absolute subjugation to France, while he consoled the nation with the efficient balance which, in India conquests and the establishment of the Republic of the Seven Islands, he had provided against the acquisitions of France: those who saw him, in the year 1801, retiring from the cabinet upon the openly avowed ground, that he could not in honour and in conscience remain unless permitted to propose to the parliament the measure of what was called Catholic Emancipation, and who have since seen him, having first returned to his former place, and all the circumstances continuing the same, not only refuse to support or countenance, but *oppose* that very measure: those who have had the patience to follow him through his volunteering dinners and reviews, have seen him mounted in his cars, and have read (in his own prints) the description of his cheering huzzas, while his right worthy comrade was engaged in the war of catamarans: those who now see combined fleets, and ports friendly to the enemy, created by his war of "*precaution*:" those who have viewed him in the Reports of the Naval Commissioners, and in the parliamentary proceedings consequent thereupon, and have compared the facts now brought to light, with his former opinions, professions, and boasts: those who have thus observed, and thus reflected, will be at no loss justly to estimate the character and merits of Mr. Pitt; and, if they love their country, they will, I am persuaded, turn, with indignation, from the assertion of this hired writer, that, let whatever charges will take place, "the *people* will *demand*, that Mr. Pitt shall have a principal share in the ministry." Such persons will clearly perceive, that all the dangers, to which the country is now exposed, have proceeded from the bad measures of Mr. Pitt; and, as the most favourable to him, and the least likely to be unjust, they will impute those measures to his deficiency in that sort of wisdom which is necessary to the conception and execution of measures calculated to promote the true and permanent interests of a state. They will have perceived, that, even in the department which he has made his chief study; in which he seems to have aimed at excellence; and, as to his skill in which he has received so much applause, he has, upon every material point, every point requiring profundity of thought, been conspicuous for nothing but his errors. His expertness at estimating a tax; his dexterity at defending his impositions of all sorts; his art in enlisting all the selfish feelings on his side, in laying fear under contribution, and in opening the hand of avarice; these he possesses in an admirable degree, and to these he owes the admiration, with which he is always spoken of by those who have spent their lives behind the counter. But, in the science of political œconomy, what are these? At most, they render a man, amongst real statesmen, what a punster is among poets. Of all his errors respecting the French revolution, none was greater, or more fatal in its consequences, than that re-

lative to the *financial resources* of France; and, we now find, that he erred, too, and in spite of good advice. The warning, the predictions, of Mr. Fox we cannot blame him for having viewed with an eye of distrust; but, the same apology cannot be made for him with regard to the advice of Mr. Burke, who, in a memorial submitted to himself privately, in 1791; even at the very onset, warned him, earnestly besought him, not to place any reliance on what was looked forward to as the effects of a national bankruptcy in France.* He was not only *told*, that no circumstance of that sort would have any effect as to the progress of the revolution, or that extension of French power and dominion, to which the revolution naturally tended; but, the *reasons* upon which the opinion was founded, were amply laid before him. Still, however, did he declaim upon the *poverty*, the approaching *bankruptcy*, of France; and, by the aid of his worthy fellow-labourer, Sir Francis D'Ivernois (a man of exactly the same size of mind), succeeded, in persuading the parliament, year after year, that they had only to make *one more* effort, to draw their purses once more, in order to bring the enemy to their feet. To me, who used to read the English papers in America, it really appeared that the stupid citizens of London were in expectation of seeing Carnot and Barras brought up before the Commissioners in Guildhall. Here we have a striking proof of the difference between the mind of Mr. Burke and that of Mr. Pitt, and of the vast superiority of the former over the latter. If Mr. Burke had been the minister of England at the epoch referred to, no reliance would have been placed upon a bankruptcy in France; no false hope would have been entertained; the people would have been amused with no delusion; they would have seen the enemy and the nature of the contest in their true light; and, they would have made exertions proportioned thereunto, or they would have demanded peace. By either course their security *might* ultimately have been provided for; but, by following neither; by taking no decisive part; by inspiring all the parties on our side with distrust, and by acting with just vigour enough to call forth the energies, and to furnish a pretext for the aggressions, of the enemy, the consequences that we now see and feel were produced. It is not, then, in the "difficulty of the times," but, in the want of wisdom, or, in some other want still more important, in the minister, that we are to look for the cause of the dangers, to which we are now exposed; and, I trust, that the reader will be of opinion with me, that, for all these dangers and for whatever calamities may result from them, Mr. Pitt owes to the nation a complete responsibility.

* See Burke's works, Vol. VII. p. 47.

INVASION.——"Why, so, being gone, "I am a man again!" And so is the Editor of the Morning Post, who now talks as big as he did last year, when he published the *first* account of the catamaran expedition. ——The public, and the "fasionable world," for whose particular use the Morning Post is published, will recollect, that it is only about three weeks, since that paper assured its readers, that the ministers had received "*certain* information, that the Corsican Usurper" (for so now they call their old friend) was coming with a most formidable force; and, it will not be forgotten, perhaps, that the public were cautioned against believing what the ministers so confidently believed. It now appears, that that caution was not without reason; for, instead of invading England, Buonaparté seems to have been, even at that moment, preparing for an invasion of the dominions of Austria. Great, however, is the exultation of the hireling papers; and, it is necessary to lay before the reader some few of the passages, wherein they express it, in order to point out to him what he has to guard against; for, if Buonaparté should, in a few months return to his projects of invasion, and find us in the state which these exultations are calculated to produce, the danger will be much greater than it ever yet has been. "It "is now," says the Morning Post of the 6th instant, "known for *certain*, that Buo- "naparté has suddenly raised his camps at "Boulogne and its neighbourhood; that "the 112,000 men which he was so lately "reviewing, previous to their embarkation "for the invasion of our shores, he is now "marching to meet or to attack the Aus- "trians, and to seize the more favourable "chance that offers of victory, before they "can effectually co-operate with Russia. "This, no doubt, was the secret policy that "dictated all his panegyrics on peace, and "all his commentaries on the calamities of "war; while, under the affected menace "of an invasion of England, he was ac- "cumulating the means of prosecuting his "conquests, and extending his domination "over the Continent. It must, however, "be no slight alarm that compels him to "suspend or abandon a project, with the "accomplishment of which he has so long "fired the passions, and familiarised the

" hopes of his army. He must also feel no " small degree of *shame and humiliation*, " not unmingled with regret, at relinquish- " ing even the outward shew of an enterprise " of which he was so boastful, which he " *foolishly imagined struck such terror into* " *the minds of Englishmen*, that they could " attend to nothing but defensive measures, " and the security of their homes."——On the 7th the subject is continued thus: " Dis- " patches were yesterday received at the " Admiralty from Lord Keith, which con- " tain an ample confirmation of the intelli- " gence given in our last, relative to the " breaking up of the camps on the French " coast, and the march of the troops towards " the Rhine. We are further informed, that " the flotilla to convey these troops to the " invasion of Britain, is to be forthwith " dismantled, and that considerable progress " has already been made in this work of " *undoing* what was done with so much " ostentation of power, and so much in- " solence of menace. Like the vast pre- " parations of Caligula for the conquest of " Germany, the mighty threats of Buona- " parté for the subjugation of Britain, are " thus turned to *his scorn*. The design of " invasion, which, not long since, mini- " sters knew to be seriously entertained, " appears now to be, at least for a time, " *completely abandoned*. Upon this subject " we shall take an early opportunity of " offering some remarks; contenting our- " selves, for the present, with the brief " remark, that the enemy having *declined* " the combat they provoked, is to them " a virtual *defeat* while to us it is in effect " equal to a *victory*.——Having no longar " 200,000 disciplined soldiers placed in a " position from which they might pour in " upon us, in a few hours of favourable " coincidence, and watching for the op- " portunity; having the advantage of ac- " ting with allies, capable of engaging, " and we trust, defeating the greater part " of the vast armies that were to be pour- " ed down upon us, horde after horde, " till we should be consumed, even by " the destruction of continued victories, " if we should be fortunate enough to gain " them; we have now to congratulate our- " selves that the time is arrived, when " we can, with effect, act on the offen- " sive, and *alarm the threatner with inva-* " *sion* in our turn. We can now spare " thirty or forty thousand men to attack " the enemy in any quarter where such an " enterprise may appear to promise most " effect and advantage."——The most ef- fectual way, perhaps, of cautioning some readers against confiding in the opinions (if they can be called opinions) of bab- blers like this, will be to quote, word for word, what he wrote and published on the 5th of October last, just as the news of the Pitt and Dundas expedition arrived in London. " The result of this expedi- " tion, planned with as much secrecy as " judgment, and executed with the most un- " paralleled bravery, will prove both to foreign " boasters and factious Britons, that this " is a country which cannot be insulted or " menaced with impunity. The enemy " threatened us. Let them look to their " own shores. Their innumerable flotilla " was to land their invincible army in this " country, which was to prove a rich and " easy conquest; it was to bear the for- " tune and destiny of France to our coast. " Where is now this boasted flotilla? " What is the present state of the for- " tune and destiny of France, which were " so pompously committed to it? All that " was *accessible* of it is *destroyed*. *Sea,* " *fire, and air, have witnessed and con-* " *tributed to its destruction.* What is be- " come of that part which is not destroyed? " It *skulks in its harbours*, and *even doubts* " *whether its skulking ensures it safety?* " ——This is a most fortunate thing " for the country."——Reader, put not your trust in such writers: their busi- ness, their trade, is to amuse, to deceive you; by turns to alarm and to cheer you; they are paid for it. Believe them not, I conjure you, upon any subject, but particu- larly upon the subject of invasion. Observe, they now tell you, that they are *certain* that Buonaparté is *not* coming; and this they do with just as much confidence, and, appa- rently, with the same expectation of being believed, that they, only twenty days ago, told you they were *certain* that he *was* coming! And, I earnestly beg you not to regard the scheme of invasion as " *aban-* " *doned.*" No: do not think that we have gained a " *victory*" over the flotilla. Join with me, rather, in regretting that Buona- parté has discovered so effectual a mode of annoying us by the means of a force, which, at a moment's warning, he can direct against the powers of the continent; and, I may, surely, desire you to recollect, that, I have frequently stated, that part of the plan of Buonaparté was, by the maritime camps, if I may use the expression, to keep an army in preparation for a continental war; and this you will find laid down as part of his plan, in a French essay upon the sub- ject, part of which will be found in the sup- plement to the first volume of this work.

Nothing, therefore, is so foolish; nothing so empty; nothing at once so contemptible and so dangerous as these boasts about *victories* over the flotilla.

[In the next number I shall endeavour to pay the arrears due to the *Pitt and Dundas faction*. They are hard at work, both in Scotland and in England. Their instruments, of all sorts, are in motion. But, let us hope, that there will be found industry on our side sufficient to counteract their efforts.——The *dinner* at Edinburgh will merit particular attention.]

Botley, Thursday, }
12th Sept. 1805. }

PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE CAPTURE AND DETENTION OF CAPTAIN WRIGHT, COMMANDING HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S BRIG EL VINCEJO, TAKEN BY THE FRENCH IN QUIBERON BAY, MAY 20TH, 1804: MOVED FOR BY MR. WINDHAM, AND LAID BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS JULY THE 12TH, 1805.

Letter from Mr. Marsden, Secretary to the Admiralty, to Mr. Cooke, Under Secretary of State for the Department of War and the Colonies, dated Admiralty Office, 17th July, 1804.

SIR,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you herewith the enclosed copy of a letter from M. Riviere, of the Office of the French Minister of Marine, to the Commissioners of Transports, relative to the capitulation of the enemy's forces at the Island of St. Domingo, and to request you will lay the same before Lord Camden, for his lordship's information and directions thereupon. I am, &c.—WM. MARSDEN.

Translation of a Letter from M. Riviere to the Commissioners of Transports, dated Paris, 12th June, 1804.

GENTLEMEN,—The Minister of the Department of Marine and Colonies being informed that the crews of different vessels, as well as the several garrisons which evacuated the Cape in the Island of St. Domingo (in virtue of the capitulation made on board the frigate La Surveillante, the 30th of Nov., 1803), are detained prisoners in England, his Exc. has ordered me to claim, in his name, on the grounds hereinafter stated, the return to France of these crews and garrisons, in conformity to the 2d article of the said convention. It is conceived in these terms—"The garrison of the Cape, embarked on board of the different vessels, and the crews of these vessels shall be prisoners of war, and sent to Europe as soon as possible, upon their parole, not to serve until exchanged," &c. It is readily to be conceived that the spirit of this article, would, for greater exactness, require the word France to be substituted for that of "Europe."—But it would be an offence towards the English national character to suppose that its government could take advantage of a mere defect of precision in the choice of words, to infringe a capitulation, of which the very spirit is so explicitly developed by the very conditions which they who capitulated have subscribed.—In effect, if the intent and spirit of the capitulation had not been, that the garrisons and crews, who thereby constituted themselves prisoners of war, should be sent to France the soonest possible, instead of being detained in England, it is evident that their conveyance to Europe would not have been shackled by the condition of giving their parole not to serve before being exchanged.—No doubt but the military men on both sides, as well those whom the events of war forced to abandon the post which they had to defend, as those to whom they were forced to yield it up, frankly and fairly understood the spirit of the conditions which they signed, without a grammatical arrangement of the phraseology. And they never supposed that any discussion about mere words would afterwards arise upon a matter so thoroughly established by the essential condition of Art. II.—His Exc. is therefore led by his own innate equity to think, that if the British govt. believes itself authorised to retain the troops and sailors who capitulated at the Cape, that belief can only be owing to its not having sufficiently fixed its attention on this second article of the capitulation, and especially on these expressions, which form so very essential a part thereof, viz. "and shall be sent to Europe on their parole not to serve until exchanged."—His Exc. orders me to request you to lay these important observations before the Lords of the Admiralty; and he likes to cherish the belief, that the very line of conduct he himself would pursue, in a similar case, namely, to conform to the manifest spirit of the capitulation, will turn out to be that which their lordships will not hesitate to adopt in this. His Exc. observes, that the misfortunes of war are sufficiently grave in themselves, without those persons, who called by their places to such extensive influence over the lot of humanity, descending to aggravate them by resorting to evasions and quibbles unworthy their public character.—It is come round to his Exc's ears, that certain persons in England have supposed, that prisoners of war, sent back to France upon parole, have been there employed before

they were exchanged. Without chusing to dwell upon an allegation which has only reached him indirectly, his Exc., however, charges me to acquaint you, that no infraction of this nature has taken place.—On the other hand, I have laid before him the representations which you have desired me to submit to him, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war detained in France.—His Exc. has very lately had occasion to carry on some correspondence with the most distinguished among these prisoners, and nothing in course of it has led him to perceive any tendency to complaint on this subject. Nevertheless he has, inasmuch as the police over them depends upon the Minister of War, applied to the Marshal of the Empire, having that department, for proper attention to be paid to your representation on this head, should it prove founded. And, as soon as his answer shall come to hand, you shall be informed of the real state of things.—But you may rely upon it before-hand, gentlemen, that none of the duties which humanity prescribes in favour of prisoners of war will be neglected; for such is the formal intention of his Imperial Majesty. I have, &c. (Signed) RIVIERE.

Letter from E. Cook, Esq. Under Secretary of State for the Department of War and the Colonies, to W. Marsden, Esq. Secretary to the Admiralty, dated, Downing Street, Aug. 28, 1804.

SIR,—I have had the honour to lay before Lord Camden your letter of the 17th ult. inclosing the copy of a letter from M. Riviere, written by order of the French Minister of Marine and Colonies, to the Commissioners for the custody of Prisoners of War, claiming the release of the French crews and garrisons that were made prisoners by his Majesty's squadron off Cape François, in the island of St. Domingo, on the 30th Nov. last, in virtue of the 2d art. of the convention then agreed to by the English and French commanders; and in answer thereto, I am directed to communicate to you his lordship's sentiments, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in order that they may be transmitted through M. Riviere to the French govt. In that letter M. Riviere states, that the minister, under whose orders he acts, directs him to observe, "that the misfortunes of war are sufficiently heavy in themselves, and call particularly on those who, by their situation on either side, are so powerfully enabled to influence the fate of humanity, not to seek occasions reciprocally to aggravate those misfortunes still more, either by evasions or discussions unworthy of their public character;" and he concludes his dispatch by remarking, "that the Admiralty may be assured of the direct and decided intention of the French govt., that none of the duties of humanity shall be neglected in favour of prisoners of war."—The sentiments thus avowed, are congenial with those which are entertained by his Majesty's ministers; and, however much the conduct hitherto adopted by the French govt. has differed from those sentiments, I am, notwithstanding, directed by Lord Camden to lay before you the following statement, as he cannot, from M. Riviere's expressions, but entertain the expectation, that when the justice of the cases which I proceed to lay before you for his information, shall be considered, the French govt. will afford that satisfaction to this country which she has a right to expect. —At the very outset of the war, even before his Majesty's ambassador had left France, a very considerable number of his Majesty's subjects who resided in France by the permission of the French govt., and on the faith of the law of nations, or under protection of passports from the ministers of France, were, in defiance of the established practice of European nations, detained as prisoners in France, and have since been confined in distant fortresses in that country. Whilst this flagrant violation of those laws and customs, by which civilised nations have been so long guided, has taken place in France, his Majesty's govt. have yet allowed all persons who are of the class known in the cartel of last war by the designation of "Non Combatants," to return to France; and 526 persons of this description have been actually sent to France, whilst only one person of the same description is known by the Transport Board to have been sent from France to this country. Lord Camden conceives that this plain statement sufficiently marks the different principles which have actuated the conduct of the two nations, and therefore makes no further comment or observation upon it, but directs me to state to you other circumstances connected with this subject.—In the month of June, 1803, a detachment of his Majesty's troops landed on the Island of St. Lucia; and on terms of capitulation being refused, they stormed the chief fortress on that island, and took the garrison prisoners of war; but so far from using the power which a victory so obtained might have afforded him, his Majesty's commanding officer, though he might have kept the garrison prisoners in the West Indies, though he might have sent them to England, stripped of all their private property, there to be retained in prison; yet, upon the highest

principle of honour and humanity, he sent them to their own country on their parole, with an entire confidence of their being immediately exchanged. No acknowledgment of this generous conduct has been made, and not a single British prisoner has been released in return for the garrison of St. Lucia.—In the same month of June, 1803, the Island of Tobago was attacked by a strong British force, and, on being summoned to surrender, Gen. Berthier, the Commandant, not being in a situation to make resistance, proposed a capitulation the most favourable to the French garrison, which consisted only of 89 rank and file. It was in the power of his Majesty's commanding officer to have forced the garrison to surrender at discretion, yet he humanely agreed to the capitulation proposed, and sent the garrison to France at the expense of G. Br.—In Oct., 1803, the French garrison of Pondicherry, consisting of 177 persons, cut off from all possibility of support, were summoned to surrender, by a strong detachment of his Majesty's forces, when, on their proposing a capitulation, the British commanding officer, who might have reduced them without the danger of loss, consented to allow them the most favourable and generous conditions; they were to be carried to France, and to receive their full pay till their arrival from the Indian Company, and were only debarred from serving again for a year and a day.—A cartel ship, named the Matilda, was taken into employment for this service, which a few days ago arrived in the Channel, and immediately proceeded off Havre. That port being blockaded, the cartel was directed to proceed to Fecamp. Upon its arrival off that port, no notice being taken of the ship, several of the French officers requested to be allowed to enter the port in a boat. This was permitted; but, on advancing near the harbour with a flag of truce, the boat was so repeatedly fired upon, that they were obliged to relinquish the attempt, and the cartel has arrived in the Downs.—Notwithstanding these circumstances, and that the last public cartel ship was fired upon from Morlaix, which is pointed out by the French govt. as the port to which flags of truce are to be sent, the cartel has been ordered to proceed to that port, and to make another attempt to carry the capitulation entered into at Pondicherry into execution.—I now proceed to state individual cases, to shew the spirit which actuates the govt. of France. Capt. Purien, commander of the French frigate the François, was allowed to go to France, on his parole to return to England in 3 months, if he could not procure the exchange of Capt. Brenton, of his Majesty's frigate the Minerva. The liberation of Capt. Brenton has been refused, and the French govt. have proposed to substitute; 1st, Col. Craufurd; 2dly, Mr. M'Namara; and, 3dly, a Col. Smith; the two former of whom being resident in France at the time of the rupture between the two countries, were detained as prisoners contrary to the law of nations; and Col. Smith is not known to be in the army or navy of this country.—I am next to advert to the capture and detention of Lieut. Dillon of his Majesty's frigate L'Africaine. He was sent into Helvoet on the 20th of July, 1803, in a six-oared cutter, with a flag of truce, and was there seized and detained with his crew. Upon a representation being made on the subject, a letter was received from the officer commanding at the Texel, under date Oct. 16, 1803, to the officer commanding his Britannic Majesty's ships off that port, stating, that orders had been issued by the Council of the Batavian Navy, to the commanding officer at Helveot, on the 30th of July preceding, for the entire release of the said Lieut., flag of truce, and equipage; in consequence whereof he departed the same day, but that he was on his return carried back by a French armed boat, and transported on board the ship of the commandant of a French division stationed at the same port. It appears that remonstrances have been made by the Batavian republic to the French govt., for the liberation of Lieut. Dillon, but notwithstanding these circumstances, Lieut. Dillon is still detained a prisoner in the territory of France, in open violation of every privilege in relation to flags of truce established and acknowledged by civilized nations.—But the case of Capt. Wright deserves and requires more observation than even any of these I have laid before you: it appears that Capt. Wright, commanding his Majesty's sloop El Vincejo (which was taken off the coast of Britanny, on the 20th of May last, by several gunboats) instead of meeting with that liberal treatment which has uniformly been experienced by French officers in similar cases, was sent, with circumstances of peculiar indignity and severity, to Paris, subjected to close imprisonment in the Temple, and obliged to undergo repeated interrogatories before a court of justice, when none of the facts alleged against him would, if true, authorise the French govt. to consider Capt. Wright in other light than as a prisoner of war, and as entitled to every privilege of that situation. Lord Camden finds it difficult to permit me to advert to a case of this flagrant nature in the terms and expressions to which

this communication ought to be confined; for he believes that no age has yet produced an instance of a gallant officer, who, after defending his ship to the utmost, was obliged to surrender, and who, thus becoming a prisoner of war, was entitled to all the respect which his conduct merited, was yet dragged to the capital of the hostile country, and interrogated there, in a manner most unjustifiable, upon a subject to which he could not, and ought not to answer. Capt. Wright's judgment and firmness appeared to be as conspicuous, under the circumstances in which he was placed, as his gallantry in his particular profession; but he yet remains a close prisoner in the Temple at Paris, an example of the honour, the firmness, and the spirit of the British character.—Here I close this statement: and I now proceed to state to you for the information of M. Riviere, that, in order to lessen the evils of war, and to consult the interests of humanity, his Majesty has twice invited the French govt. to accede to the principle of a general cartel, founded on the basis of that which existed between the two nations in the last war. The accession to those proposals has, however, been evaded by the French govt., by insisting that the Hanoverians are to be considered as British prisoners, when they cannot be ignorant that the cause of the invasion of Hanover, and the war with the King of G. Britain, are perfectly distinct in all their circumstances; when they know, that during several years of the last war, the electoral dominions of Hanover were at peace with France, and that no mention was made of Hanover in the treaty of the peace at Amiens, as forming in any manner whatsoever a part of the British empire; and when they equally know that no Hanoverian is a British subject; but, on the contrary, considered by the laws of G. Britain as an alien and foreigner, and over whom there is no control in this country.—Having laid before you this statement, it only remains for me to advert to the particular subject of M. Riviere's letter, viz. that those French prisoners which surrendered at Cape François, by capitulation, in Nov. 1803, should be sent to France without delay. On this part of the subject, I am, in the first place, directed by Lord Camden to refer you to the enclosed copy of the statement to Vice-Admiral Duckworth, by Capt. Bligh, respecting the said capitulation, in order that, by a communication thereof to M. Riviere, no pretence may be made of ignorance with respect to all its particulars. Upon the statement of Capt. Bligh, Lord Camden directs me to make the following observations: First, it appears that in a moment the most critical to the French garrison, all possibility of their escape cut off, their position being such, that their falling a sacrifice to the vengeance of the inhabitants of St. Domingo was inevitable, no time being allowed for consideration and adjustment of the terms and niceties of a formal capitulation, a paper of articles already prepared by the French commanding officer was presented to Capt. Bligh, who, actuated by motives of generosity and compassion, immediately consented thereto, with certain modifications, and with great difficulty induced General Dessalines also to consent to them: which modifications (as there was not time to reduce them into regular written terms) the French commanders, in the presence of Capt. Bligh and three of his officers, promised on their honour to ratify as soon as they should arrive at Jamaica. Secondly, on the faith of this promise, thus fully and distinctly given in the presence of four British officers, who certify the fact, the French garrison were received under the protection of his Majesty's squadron, and removed for certain immediate destruction; but as soon as by these means they were placed in a state of security, they retracted their promise, and refused to ratify the very engagements by which they were saved.—— Lord Camden has thought it necessary that a statement of the transactions which took place at Cape François, should be detailed to M. Riviere, in order that the French government may be aware of all the circumstances of the case, and how equitable his Majesty might be authorised in acting conformably thereto. Still, however, with that scrupulous adherence to capitulations and treaties which has ever distinguished this nation, his Majesty will not insist upon any point which is not included in the words of the capitulation of Cape François, and will be guided in his conduct by the written instrument alone. I am now, therefore, directed by Lord Camden, to desire that it may be stated to M. Riviere, that no time will be lost in carrying into execution the capitulation of Cape Françoise, whenever his Majesty's government, shall be enabled, from the conduct of the French government, to effectuate that measure; and that, so soon as a number of British prisoners, equal in number, and proportionate in rank to the garrison of St. Lucia, shall be sent to England, a proportion of the garrison which capitulated at Cape François shall be sent to France, in order to be exchanged. This proposition is made upon the principle of evincing the most scrupulous regard to the

capitulations agreed to by his Majesty's officers; but Lord Camden hopes that the French government may be induced to ulterior measures, in which the cause of general justice and humanity is concerned, and which are calculated to alleviate those evils of warfare, which M. Riviere so truly states ought not to be aggravated.——I am therefore, secondly, to desire it should be proposed to M. Riviere, that if the French government shall release those persons, natives of Great Britain and Ireland, who were resident in France at the commencement of hostilities by the permission of the French government, or the passports of their ministers, and who have been detained in France captives contrary to the law of nations: and if Lieutenant Dillon shall be liberated, and Captain Wright released from his confinement, and treated as a prisoner of war, a general cartel, upon the basis so properly agreed to during the course of the last war, should be established between the two countries.——It must be obvious to M. Riviere, and to the French minister of marine under whom he acts, how deeply his Majesty must be impressed by the lengthened and unjust captivity of his subjects; and by the circumstances of Lieutenant Dillon's detention, and Captain Wright's imprisonment; and how reasonable it is to expect an honourable redress in these points, previous to the establishment of a general cartel. When this sentiment is conveyed to M Riviere, I am directed to desire their lordships may at the same time impress upon him the confident expectation of his Majesty's government, that if the French government shall embrace the measure of a general cartel, they will not again impede its progress, by requiring terms in which it is known that it is impossible for his Majesty to acquiesce. I am, &c. (Signed) EDWARD COOKE.

Letter from Captain Bligh to Vice Admiral Sir J. Duckworth inclosed in the above Dispatch. Dated on board the his Majesty's Ship Theseus, Port Royal, Jamaica, December 11, 1803.

SIR,——On the morning of the 30th of November I received orders from Captain Loring to proceed to Cape François to ascertain the real situation of the French, and the reason of their remaining in the port after the forts had been taken possession of by the Blacks; and for my knowledge of the circumstances, to act as I should deem most expedient.——When I had proceeded as far as the entrance of the harbour, I was met by the guard-boat, which I thought proper to accompany on board the Surveillante, I acquainted Captain Barre, that, having perceived the colours of the Blacks hoisted at the batteries, and every appearance of a strong north wind coming on, which would necessarily prevent their putting to sea, we were induced, by motives which always actuate a civilised people, to afford them once more an opportunity of entering into terms of capitulation, which would effectually prevent their falling into the hands of the Blacks. They instantly presented me terms of capitulation, to which I consented, with some exceptions, and for which I received Gen. Boyer's and Capt. Barre's word of honour (in the presence of the officers, whose names are hereunto subscribed) that they would alter, according to my explanation, or Capt. Loring's (the senior officer), on their arrival at Jamaica. ——I was disposed to concur in this arrangement the more readily, as I was assured by Capt. Barre, that they were threatened with being fired upon with red-hot shot if every ship was not out of the harbour by 6 that evening. The time was critical, and I conceived it necessary, in order to prevent this threat from being carried into execution, to have some written document immediately to produce to General Dessalines, to prove to him, that they had become prizes to His Britannic Majesty's squadron.——On my waiting on the Black General, at half past 5, it was with considerable difficulty I prevailed upon him to desist from his intention of firing into the ships if they did not leave the Cape within the appointed time; although, at this time, it was an impossibility, the wind blowing direct into the harbour, and nothing but their having surrendered to the squadron of His Britannic Majesty prevented him from doing so.——I feel extreme surprise, sir, in hearing that Gen. Boyer and Capt. Barre have refused to make the alterations they had pledged themselves to do on their arrival at Jamaica. They are well aware of the circumstances under which the capitulation was made, as well as the urgency of the time, which admitted only of verbal explanation and parole evidence.——According to those explanations, the 2d and 5th article of the capitulation were greatly restricted from the sense which, I understand, they will have them to bear.——By the 2d article it never was intended that any but the officers should have their parole; and that only to return to Europe meaning England, in order that their exchange might be effected without delay. And the 5th article meant only that personal property should be respected, of course, without including mer-

chandize, or public property which might be found on board the vessels. I have, &c. (Signed) JOHN BLIGH.

We whose names are hereunto suscribed do testify to the truth of the above explanations of the 2d and 5th articles of capitulation off Cape François, and likewise of the promise made in our presence by General Boyer and Captain Barre, that they would ratify them accordingly on their arrival at Jamaica. — (Signed) J. PERKINS, Capt. of the Tartar; F. MACDONALD, Lieut. of the Theseus; E. WROTTESLEY, Midshipman of the Theseus.

Letter from Lord Harrowby to the Chevalier d'Anduaga, dated July 18, 1804.

SIR,—The obstacles which have been opposed by the French government to all communication between the two countries, as well as the want of any authentic information respecting what passes at Paris, have hitherto prevented me from expressing his Majesty's sentiments as to the manner in which a British officer of distinguished character is said to have been treated. As, however, an opening appears to be offered (in consequence of the conversation I had the honour of holding with you on Monday last), of apprising that government, through the medium of the Spanish ambassador at Paris, of the light in which his Majesty views the proceeding which is understood to have taken place, it is my duty not to lose the opportunity which you are pleased to afford me, of endeavouring, by representation, to avert the consequences which must follow so great a violation of the rights of nations, and the usages of war.——If the accounts published in the French papers are correct, it appears, that Captain Wright, commanding his Majesty's ship El Vincejo, who was taken off the Coast of Britanny, on the 20th of May last, by several gun-boats, instead of meeting with that liberal treatment which has uniformly been experienced by French officers in similar cases, was sent, with circumstances of peculiar indignity and severity, to Paris, subjected to close confinement in the Temple, and obliged to undergo repeated interrogatories before a court of Criminal Justice. ——It is unnecessary for me to enter into the discussion of those pretences by which this treatment is attempted to be justified, as none of the facts would, even if true, authorise the French government to consider Captain Wright in any other light than as a prisoner of war, and as entitled to every privilege of that situation.—— To call upon a prisoner of war to answer interrogatories, in order to produce proof against himself of some alleged crime, supposed to have been committed previous to his capture, and even anterior to the present war, is evidently inconsistent with every principle of justice, and to abridge his personal liberty, much more to confine him as a prisoner of state, is contrary to that mitigated exercise of the rights of war, which has formed the boast of civilized Europe.——I have been directed, sir, to state these sentiments to you, in the confidence that you will take the first opportunity of conveying them to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, and of requesting him to communicate them to the French government.——His Majesty, ever unwilling to add to the calamities of war, is desirous of trying, through a friendly channel, to procure that redress, by remonstrance, which he must ultimately be compelled to seek by means less agreeable to his inclinations. He will abstain from having recourse to those means while he entertains the hope, that such an answer will be given through the same channel as may satisfy his just expectations; but, if he learns that, notwithstanding this representation, the imprisonment of Captain Wright is still continued, he will no longer feel himself justified in delaying to treat with the same rigour some officer of equal or superior rank, whom the chance of war has placed in his power, and to consider such officer as an hostage for the safety of Captain Wright.——I must beg you, sir, to accept my best thanks for the obliging manner in which you have allowed me to make use of your intervention, upon an occasion equally interesting to humanity and to justice. I have the honour to be, &c.——(Signed) HARROWEY.

Letter from the Chevalier d'Anduaga to Lord Harrowby, dated Portland-place, 19th July, 1804.

MY LORD,——I have received the note your lordship has done me the honour of addressing to me; in which I am desired to forward its contents to his Catholic Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, to the end that his Britannic Majesty's sentiments on the treatment which has been exercised towards Captain Wright, may be made known to the French government.——At our last interview, I had the honour of expressing to your lordship, how much I should be flattered at being able to render myself at all useful to his Britannic Majesty's government, in facilitating its means of communication with that of France on this head. I consequently hasten to assure your lordship, that I will seize the first occasion which may offer for making such communication. —— Meanwhile, I have the satisfaction of expressing to you my very sincere wishes to see this

step crowned with such a measure of success, as may prove satisfactory to his Britannic Majesty.——I beg your lordship to accept my assurances, &c. (Signed) THE CHEVALIER D'ANDUAGA.

Letter from the Chevalier d'Anduaga to Lord Harrowby, dated Portland-place, Sept. 24, 1804.

MY LORD,——At length I have the satisfaction of announcing to your lordship, the success which has attended the steps taken in favour of Capt. Wright. By a letter from M. Talleyrand, addressed to his Catholic Majesty's Ambassador (a copy of which I have the honour of transmitting to you), your lordship will perceive, that the French government is disposed to order Mr. Wright to be placed at the disposal of his Britannic Majesty; and, for his deliverance, only waits to learn the place where this prisoner is to be consigned.——After the lively interest which is evident to have been felt by his Britannic Majesty, in the fate of this individual, I cannot but be infinitely flattered at the resolution thus taken by the French government, and I shall be no less so, as being instrumental towards the perfect conclusion of this affair.——In expressing these sentiments, I do but fulfil the wishes, and even the very orders, of the King, my master; for, no sooner was his Majesty informed of the desires of the British government, with regard to Captain Wright, than he charged his ambassador at Paris, most particularly, to omit nothing which could aid their obtaining a favourable result.——I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) THE CHEVALIER D'ANDUAGA.

Letter from M. Talleyrand to M. Gravina the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, enclosed in the preceding letter; dated, Paris (10th Fructidor, XII.), 27th August, 1804.

SIR,——I have laid before his Majesty the Emperor, the letter which you have done me the honour of communicating to me. By his order, I must recapitulate to your excellency some facts, which relate to the object of that letter. Mr. Wright was taken by our cruisers, at the very moment he was landing Jean Marie and two of his accomplices, on the coast of Britanny. Prior to this, he had already landed at three times consecutively, banditti of a similar description, who have since been brought to judgment, convicted, and punished, for having conspired against the state, and attempted the life of the First Consul. These species of acts, under whatever point of view they may otherwise be contemplated, certainly do not appertain to war. There is no age, nor any nation, in which they would not be regarded as crimes, and one may, with truth, aver, that it was *flagranti delicto*, that Mr. Wright was captured by French mariners, then officiating as an armed force.——According to accounts, to which full credit must be given, this officer had been demanded from the English Admiralty. The lords directing this department were, of course, not ignorant of the kind of service to which he was destined. The shame attached to the premeditation and execution of a project, as atrocious and vile, as it was cowardly, remains entirely with the men who devised the plot, and, with him, who undertook to accomplish their views——I am ordered, Sir, to declare to your excellency, that his Majesty the Emperor will never suffer Mr. Wright to be exchanged. No Frenchman belonging, with whatever rank he may, to the imperial navy, can ever consent to be placed in the balance with that person, in a cartel of exchange. But, Sir, the Emperor, having at heart to do every thing which depends upon his Imperial Majesty, to mitigate the scourges of war, and willing to prove, that in his breast such a disposition preponderates over even motives of useful and just severity, has authorised me to declare, that his Imperial Majesty will give orders, that Mr. Wright be placed at the disposal of the English government. May I beg of you, therefore, to make known to Lord Harrowby, this generous determination of his Majesty. You will see in it, Sir, the marked intention of doing what may be personally agreeable to yourself, and his Britannic Majesty's new ministry will be constrained to recognise in it, a proof of the disposition so often manifested on the part of his Imperial Majesty, to shew himself above not only those sentiments which offences in general excite, but even above those which might spring from the attempts, of which his own person has been the object. I shall, therefore, remain in expectation of learning by your means, the place which the English government wish the prisoner of state, claimed through your intervention, to be delivered over.——I avail myself of this opportunity of renewing to your excellency the assurance of my most high consideration.—— (Signed) CHARLES MAURICE TALLEYRAND. Certified as a copy. (Signed) FREDERIC GRAVINA. Certified as a copy. (Signed) THE CHEVALIER D'ANDUAGA.

Letter from Lord Harrowby to the Chevalier d'Anduaga, dated Downing-street, Sept. 25, 1804.

SIR,——I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday

and to assure you, that his Majesty's government entertain a just sense of the liberality and generosity, with which his Catholic Majesty has been pleased to interpose his good offices, in favour of Captain Wright, and of the very obliging manner in which you and M. Gravina have complied with the request contained in my former note to you upon this subject.——As the French government has consented to liberate that officer from his present confinement, and to allow him to return to this country, I do not think proper to make any observations upon the contents of M. Talleyrand's note to Admiral Gravina. I have, therefore, to request that you, Sir, will be pleased to communicate, through M. de Gravina, to the French government, in consequence of the wish they have intimated, to know the place to which Captain Wright should be sent; that it is the desire of his Majesty's government, that he should be sent to Dover in a flag of truce; or, if there is any objection to that mode of liberating him, that he may be allowed to quit the territories of France, for the purpose of proceeding to Embden, or any other neutral port or place. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) HARROWBY.

BATAVIAN FLOTILLA.—*Vice-Admiral Verheuil's detailed Report of the Engagements of the 17th and 18th July, addressed to his Majesty Napoleon I. Emperor of the French and King of Italy. Dated Ambleteuse, July 26th*, 1805.

(Concluded from p. 381)

These results of the combats, as obstinate as unequal, are all in our favour, since we have not lost a single armed boat; and although the enemy had at least 900 cannon directed against us, and that we had only 180 on our 21 gun-boats and our three praams, they were not able to stop us a single moment on our passage, nor even to derange our order of battle. Although there were several boats much damaged, there was only one that quitted the line, and that only as she was about to sink. I ought again to do justice to the officers who commanded in this last affair, and I have the honour to name them here, in order to make them known to your Imperial and Royal Majesty; they are, for the 3 praams, M. M. Coren, Mestdagh, and Cloupet; and for the 21 gun-boats, M. M. Van der Læf, Bolken, Metma, Schotman, Waardenburg, Ribbing, Van der Hart, Hinxt, Van der Pels, Reigig, Tuchs, Victor, Gerhards, Sels, Caspers, Lutkens, Van Berensten, Bodel, Morrel, Olyve, and Ossewarde, jun. They all merit the greatest praise, as well for their promptitude in executing my orders, as their exactness in answering my signals, and the valour with which they sustained the combats; so that one gun-boat fired 245 times with her battery of two 24 lb. cannons. The officers of the 11 gun-boats which were obliged to go into Calais, are M. M. Bezenier, Sail, Houlkoper, Reins, Van Ginkel, Berghuis, Memeling, Dillie, De Visscher, Hemmes, and Hoogdaleen; they also merit my praise.—Without permitting myself to estimate the damage that may have been sustained by the enemy, every thing leads me to presume that they have suffered more than ourselves, if it be considered that the great bodies of their ships offer a point made more certain of being hit than our small vessels, so little elevated above the surface of the water.——I ought to render the justice that is due to the two English Rear-Admirals who were engaged in the action; they made every effort to destroy us; their order of battle was well preserved, and some of their vessels shewed an audacity seldom to be met with; the obstinacy with which they fought us is worthy of having been opposed to the united arms of your Imperial and Royal Majesty and the Batavian Republic.——My good fortune in having on board the brave Marshal of the Empire, Davenot, has afforded me the highest satisfaction, since he was an eye-witness of the ardour with which the crews and garrisons rivalled each other; and I dare flatter myself that your Imperial and Royal Majesty will see in this affair a new proof of the ardour of all the Batavians for the glorious cause which they are called upon to support.——I commend myself to the high protection of your Imperial and Royal Majesty; and I have the honour to be, with the most profound respect, and the most inviolable devotion, Sire, your Imperial and Royal Majesty's most humble and most obedient servant, VERHEUIL, Vice-Admiral and Commander in Chief of the Batavian flotilla.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

BATAVIAN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.—*Speech of the Grand Pensionary, Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, at the Opening of the Legislative Assembly, on the 3d of September*, 1805. *From the Batavian Official Gazette.*

HIGH AND MIGHTY LORDS,—I have considered it necessary to call you together out of the usual course of your meeting, to propose some measures, the speedy adoption of which appears to me to be of importance for the interest of the state.—A number of regulations, which have been drawn up in pursuance of taxes already decreed, shall be laid before your high mightinesses for your deliberation. In framing these regulations,

my principal object has been to assure, on the one hand, the due distribution and collection of the taxes imposed by your high mightinesses; and, on the other hand, to take care that the people should be secured against all unnecessary embarrassments and vexations, in order that the contributions may be discharged with as little trouble and pressure as possible. Your high mightinesses must feel how nearly these measures are connected with the improvement of the finances; and that reflection will be alone sufficient to convince you of the great importance which belongs to their consideration. The wisdom, zeal, and anxiety for the welfare of the country, which distinguished the councils of your high mightinesses in your former sitting, affords me a pledge that the affairs which on this occasion shall be submitted to your high deliberation will also receive that serious consideration which their importance demands.—I could have wished, high and mighty lords, to have been able, at the critical period of the present meeting, to open to your high mightinesses a prospect from which you might have derived a well founded hope of peace; but gloomy as the political horizon may at this moment appear, we have, however, no reason to despair of a happy change, and perhaps a more solid peace will soon yield us an acceptable reparation for the present delay. Such a peace we certainly may promise ourselves from the Godlike protection of the great genius of our mighty ally; and doubtless it will be most agreeable to your high mightinesses, in so critical a period as the present, to hear from me, that during the whole of my administration I have constantly received from that illustrious ally reiterated proofs of regard and friendship, and the most solemn assurances of good-will towards the republic. This is an union of sentiment and interests which I shall ever endeavour to cherish and maintain by an unchangeable fidelity to our engagements.—With respect to the internal situation of the republic, it appears to me, high and mighty lords, that under the present circumstances we have every reason to be satisfied. The new order of affairs has, within a very short period, acquired that consolidation, and commanded that respect, which, in the ordinary course of human transactions, can only be expected to result from long established institutions. The government receives from all parts of the republic proofs of esteem and co-operation, and is thereby equally honoured and supported in the arduous task it has to perform. Our country now exhibits the grand spectacle of a wise and brave people, fully sensible of the difficult position in which they are placed, ready to make every unavoidable sacrifice for maintaining their character among nations, and therefore unanimously resolved to sustain the power of their government.—High and mighty lords, I take leave of your meeting with an earnest prayer, that the proceedings of your high mightinesses may be calculated for the benefit of the country, and that they may be crowned with the blessing of the Almighty.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

DUKE OF GLOUCESTER.——*From the London Gazette.*

Whitehall, August 25, 1805.——This evening, about half-past eight o'clock, departed this life, at Gloucester House, after a long illness, his Royal Highness William Henry Duke of Gloucester, to the great grief of their Majesties and the Royal Family.

Lord Chamberlain's Office, August 27, 1805.——Orders for the court's going into mourning on Sunday the 1st of September for his late Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, his Majesty's brother, viz.—The ladies to wear black silk, plain muslin, or long lawn, crape, or love hoods, black silk shoes, black glazed gloves, and black paper fans.——Undress, black or dark grey unwatered tabbies.——The gentlemen to wear black cloth without buttons on the sleeves or pockets, plain muslin or long lawn cravats and weepers, black swords and buckles.——Undress, dark grey frocks.

The Earl Marshal's Order for a General Mourning for his late Royal Highness William Henry Duke of Gloucester.

In pursuance of his Majesty's commands, these are to give notice, that it is expected that, upon the present occasion of the death of his late Royal Highness William Henry Duke of Gloucester, all persons do put themselves into decent mourning; the said mourning to begin on Sunday 1st the day of September.——August 27, 1805.—NORFOLK, Earl Marshal.

Horse Guards, August 27, 1805.——His Majesty does not require that the officers of the army should wear any other mourning on the present melancholy occasion, than a black crape round their left arms with their uniforms. By command of his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.——HARRY CALVERT, Adjutant-General of the Forces.

Admiralty Office, August 27, 1805.——His Majesty doth not require that the officers of his fleet or marines should wear any other mourning, on the present melancholy occasion of the death of his Royal Highness the late William Henry Duke of Gloucester, than a black crape round their left arms, with their uniforms.——WM. MARSDEN.

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